“Nothing Less than Decolonization”: The Baloch National Struggle
An interview with veteran militant intellectual Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur, and an anonymous activist
Mir Hazar Khan Ramkhani with the Marris in exile in Afghanistan, 1978. Source: Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur private photo archive via Revolutionary Papers
The Baloch question has been a festering wound in Pakistani nationalism almost since the birth of the country – one that successive governments, military or civilian, conservative or progressive, have utterly failed to resolve. This is not only due to the ruling elite’s venal consensus on exploiting the region’s rich resources, but their abject inability to share power or offer concessions to the masses even to manufacture consent for their own survival. Instead, Balochistan and the Baloch people have been grist for the mill of grand extractive schemes in service of imperial masters from the US to China, or for geostrategic games in regional wars.
The Baloch struggle for national liberation, simmering for the last seven decades has now come to a head. Militant attacks on strategic infrastructure, mining projects, and other sites are commonplace and exacting a heavy toll. On the other hand, mass political mobilisations led by female activists of the Baloch Yakjehti Council have captured the popular imagination even beyond the erstwhile sealed political borders of Balochistan. Brutal state tactics exercised across the province for decades, including “death squads” and enforced disappearances in the thousands, are no longer able to stifle discontent and an overwhelming demand for national liberation.
Where, then, does the Baloch question stand today? We present a detailed interview with two seasoned commentators – Veteran militant intellectual, Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur, was at the frontlines of the militant struggle in the 1970s as part of the infamous ‘London Group’ of leftist revolutionaries. He has since been an intellectual stalwart in the movement. He is joined by an anonymous non-Baloch Left activist who is deeply familiar with the movement. Our conversation covers the ideological and strategic role of armed resistance in the Baloch movement, its early inspiration from Maoist ideas, and the contours of the struggle today.
Jamhoor (J): Let’s start with a brief overview. How would you describe the Baloch movement today? What are its main objectives and features?
Mir Talpur (T): I believe the Baloch Raji Muchi (Baloch National Gathering, called in July 2024) is the expression of the Baloch movement today. For one, having Gwadar as its location – the epitome of the exploitation that the Baloch are suffering. Gwadar’s land, coast, and resources are being looted and sold by the state, for the benefit of China or whoever else. They belong to the people of Balochistan but are being stolen and handed over to others.
Second, the Raji Muchi is being led by Baloch women. Not that men are not involved, but women are leading it – Dr Mahrang Baloch, Sammi Deen, Dr Sabiha, Fauzia, and so many other Baloch mothers and sisters who came out on Mahrang’s call. Despite all the obstacles put up by the state and security forces, for so many women to reach Gwadar – travelling through places like Turbat, Panjgur, Surab, Quetta – is nothing short of a miracle. In a society where women have been kept backward, but also a society stigmatised as highly patriarchal, can you imagine what it means for so many people – from the elderly to the young, learned to unlearned, women, men, and youth – to join a protest called by young women?
I believe this is the largest political movement in the region today. Nowhere else in Pakistan or India, at least in present times, will you find a political movement at such a large scale, with the participation and support of so many people. If you compare it to Mama Qadeer’s Long March from Balochistan to Islamabad in 2013-2014 – I was there with him, Farzana Majeed and other sisters – the young people that joined their sit-ins would hide their faces, afraid to be recognised by the security forces. That fear is now gone.
Today, the Baloch are asserting themselves on their land, resources, and their coast. They’re saying you have no right to sell off Gwadar, or Saindak, or Reko Diq [sites of gold and copper mines] to anyone, or to sell trawlers off our coast. These are ours, and we have the right to them.
I often quote this verse by Mir Taqi Mir:
Hum ne sookhi hui shaakhon pe lahu chirka tha
Phool agar ab bhi na khiltay tou qayamat kartay
We sprayed the dried boughs with our blood
There would be Calamity had they still not burst in bud
The Baloch have had 75 years of blood and tears. And if we didn’t have this movement today, we would be facing qayamat… ruin. These flowers have blossomed from that very blood and tears. They have not gone in vain. And the Baloch have also staked their claim to their right to life. Last year, after Balach Mola Bakhsh’s extrajudicial killing in Turbat, Mahrang led the march to Islamabad facing arrests, blockades, water cannons – that was a declaration that the Baloch refuse to die just like that. If you brutalize us, we will resist!
In the larger context, this started from the issue of enforced disappearances [which have been rampant across Balochistan for decades]. But now, it has become a demand for decolonization as well. I have always told my friends in political and civil society circles that we appreciate your support for Baloch human rights, especially on enforced disappearances, but the more important question to ask is why are we picked up in the first place? The issue of enforced disappearances is crucially linked to our colonization. These cannot be separated.
“The issue of enforced disappearances is crucially linked to our colonization. These cannot be separated. ”
I feel proud that Mahrang, Sammi, Dr. Sabiha call me Baba [father]. I take pride in walking alongside them, and if I need to walk behind them, that would also be an honour. The torch is in their hands now, and they are moving forward with wisdom and grace. Look at their 13-day sit-in in Gwadar. We can easily imagine the bravery of a guerrilla fighter in the mountains, but sitting defiantly in front of your enemy for 13 days also requires tremendous bravery. You need a lot more courage to be in situations where you don’t have the option to retaliate, where your enemy can behave however they like with you. Throughout the sit-in, Mahrang was the face of the movement, and you did not see her worried or defeated. She has strength, fortitude; she represents Baloch morale, determination, will, and eloquence – everything that it is today.
Mahrang Baloch (center) leading the Baloch Raji Muchi protest in Gwadar, Balochsitan. Source: X
J: The Baloch struggle has many dimensions – social, cultural, political, and militant. Can you tell us more about these different aspects of the struggle and how they link together for the larger cause?
T: I will have to go back into the 75-year history of this movement [from the independence of Pakistan]. Even before that, there was a long history of the Baloch resisting the British – for instance, on November 13th, 1839 when Mir Mehrab Khan was martyred defending Kalat, or in 1840 when the Marri tribes defeated the British. That history shows how resisting occupation has long been part of Baloch identity. The Baloch did not get their land for free; they had to fight for it, and have always fought to protect it.
Coming to the past 75 years, on August 4th, 1947 a standstill agreement was signed between the British, the representatives of Pakistan, and the Khan of Kalat, accepting Kalat as an independent state. Kalat state had so far been under British occupation, but had maintained its distinct status in the region. On August 11th, 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared an independent Kalat state with a bicameral house, the Darul Umra (House of Lords) and Darul Awaam (House of Commons). The latter is where Ghaus Bux Bizenjo made that famous speech that the Baloch can survive without Pakistan, and if being Muslim obliges us to join Pakistan, then Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey should do the same.
After this, the Pakistani state colluded with the chiefs of Kharan and Lasbela – as the saying goes, ghar ka bhedi lanka dhaye (a traitor within destroys the home). They secured their loyalty to exert pressure on the Khan of Kalat to join Pakistan. However, they failed to persuade him and resorted to occupying Kalat, putting the Khan in jail. His brother, Shehzada Abdul Karim, fled to Afghanistan and continued to resist. But they convinced him to come back for negotiations, and promptly jailed him for 10 years. Kalat was given meagre concessions and a special status in name alone for appeasement, but it was not the same. In fact, many people may not know that the martial law of 1958 was imposed because the Khan of Kalat was accused of plotting the secession of Balochistan with Afghanistan’s help.
Headlines of the 7th October 1958 english newspaper Dawn reporting the arrest of the Khan of Kalat on charges of sedition. Source: Image of Dawn in the personal archive of Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur via Revolutionary Papers
On October 6th, 1958, another offensive was launched on Kalat, and the Khan of Kalat was jailed once again. That’s when Nawab Nauroz Khan, the chief of Zarakzai in Jhalawan, came out with his people to fight. After over a year of fighting, the Pakistani state sent a delegation with the Quran to reassure him of their commitment to a ceasefire and negotiations if he came down from the mountains. However, once he came down, they arrested and hanged his son and six comrades – three in Sukkur Jail and four in Hyderabad Jail, on July 15th, 1960. My uncle, Mir Rasool Bakhsh Talpur, took care of the bodies in Hyderabad jail, performed funeral rites and had them delivered to Kalat. Nauroz Khan was given life imprisonment and died in Hyderabad Civil Hospital on December 25th, 1965, while serving his sentence. His body too was transported to Kalat by my uncle.
But things didn’t stop here. Imagine the level of oppression they have visited on the Baloch – leaders like Ghaus Bux Bizenjo were kept in Quetta’s [notorious torture centre] Kulli Camp and tortured. Nawab Khair Bakhsh’s people were not allowed to leave Quetta. Babu Sher Muhammad Marri was exiled to Sindh and barred from returning to Balochistan.
However, in late 1961 or early 1962, Babu Sher Muhammad Marri jumped bail and went back to Balochistan. He gets the credit for laying the foundation of organized armed resistance. He organised Faraari (rebel) camps in Marri areas. Prior to that, armed struggles led by figures like Shehzada Abdul Karim, Nawab Nauroz Khan, or Ali Muhammad Mengal (who was fighting in the Mengal areas) were sporadic and spontaneous. Babu Sher Muhammad Marri’s armed resistance continued throughout Ayub Khan’s dictatorship (i.e. until 1969), until General Yahya Khan came to power. He ended Ayub’s One Unit policy [which had merged West Pakistan’s four provinces into a single unit] and Balochistan became a province again. He extended amnesty to Baloch leaders, but the Faraari camps remained intact under Mir Hazar Khan Ramkani exactly as they were under Babu Sher Muhammad Marri.
Nawab Nauroz Khan, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo appearing in court in 1961. Source: Creative Commons.
“Those who haven’t experienced the [revolutionary] social and political ethos of the 60s and 70s don’t understand how the youth used to think... how they wanted to change the world”
Then the London group became famous. I have never been to London, but I am counted among the group, along with Ahmed Rashid, Najam Sethi, Rashed Rehman, Asad Rehman, Muhammad Bhabha, and Dilip Das. These were leftist students and activists who approached Mir Hazar Khan to join Faraari camps. Some may call this romanticism, but those who haven’t experienced the social and political ethos of the 60s and 70s don’t fully understand these things. They don’t understand how the youth used to think then, how they viewed the world, and how they wanted to change it. There was Che Guevara, the resistance in Vietnam, and the example of revolution in China (which today is unfortunately even more imperialist and capitalist than the United States). We weren’t a threat. How could the five of us threaten the state of Pakistan? It wasn’t possible.
In fact, Pakistan had a chance, at the time, to bring Baloch politicians into the mainstream. But when Attaullah Khan Mengal formed the government in May 1972, the state immediately started sabotaging it using all their usual tactics and games. This was both their own impulse, because they are so insecure psychologically, and also because the Shah of Iran was not in favour of a Baloch government as it would force him to give political space to the Baloch across the border in Iran. That was a golden opportunity when Baloch leaders could have entered mainstream politics.
Sher Muhammad Marri (second from left) stands with members of the Faraari. Source: Babar Mirza
But Pakistan used such insidious tactics – for instance, they plotted with the Jam of Lasbela, Jam Ghulam Qadir. Then there was the famous Hyderabad Conspiracy Case in 1973 – weapons were “uncovered” in a raid at the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, allegedly supplied by the Soviets to Baloch insurgents for use against Pakistan and Iran. Rafi Raza was minister at the time and he told me they had known for months that arms were being transported from Karachi to the embassy. They made a spectacle of finding them, bringing along local and international media. Based on this alleged conspiracy, they dismissed the government of Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo on February 13th, 1973. I was in Balochistan in those days and my uncle, Mir Rasool Bakhsh Talpur, was the governor of Sindh. Some ministers from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) accused my father of being involved in the conspiracy because of me. So my uncle resigned from the governorship on the same day that the Balochistan government was dismissed.
Of course, the government’s dismissal triggered unrest in Balochistan. The Marri and Mengal areas were slowly being blockaded and deprived of rations. The people were left with no other option but to resist. An ambush on a patrol killed eight Dir Scouts near Tandoori (bordering the Marri areas) on May 18th, 1973. This gave them [the state] what the wanted – I say this because only three days later, on May 21st, a huge number of army personnel were airlifted into Maiwand in the center of the Marri area to begin military operations. These military operations did not remain small – they were division strength operations, and the people resisted. The Mengals were fighting in the Mengal areas; there was Aslam Gichki in Makran, Safar Khan Zarakzai in Jhalawan. So the struggle was no longer localised, like Babu Sher Muhammad Marri was to the Marri areas. By 1973, the insurgency was widespread across Balochistan.
A lot of Baloch left for Afghanistan at this time for their protection; even I left in 1978. The same year, Zia ul Haq’s martial law regime declared amnesty for those in Afghanistan and many Baloch leaders returned, including Mehrullah Mengal, Aslam Gichki, Lal Bakhsh Rind, Khair Jan Baloch and others, except for the Marris, Mir Hazar Khan and us (London group members).
In December 1981, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri also arrived in Afghanistan and stayed there for 11 years. People often question why. But I believe it was an act of defiance. While there was no active armed struggle at the time, the Baloch and Marris staying in Afghanistan underscored the fact that they will resist. I also stayed with Baloch comrades for 13 years. Had that defiance not been asserted, the insurgency of today would not have existed. That formed the impetus for the Baloch people to insist that they are uncompromising on the question of Balochistan.
J: You have sketched a good overview of the colonial roots of the armed struggle, and then its evolution post-Partition and its contradictions with the state. Can you talk more about how armed resistance has worked with the political sphere of the Baloch struggle? How has this been strategically coordinated and how has it evolved?
T: Think of a building and its scaffolding – the two are interlinked. If you say the building represents the political struggle, then the scaffolding is an armed struggle. And sometimes the structure gets flipped – the building becomes the armed struggle and the scaffolding the political struggle. That is how it has been in the Baloch context from day one. Since the Khan of Kalat was removed, which was a political act by Pakistan, there was a political and military act by Shehzada Abdul Karim in resistance. Then the struggle of Nawab Nauroz Khan was in the same spirit. So, both armed struggle and political struggle have been the essence of the Baloch movement. They complement each other.
Two years ago, I was invited to speak at Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri’s death anniversary in Quetta. There, I said that had it not been for the few young Baloch fighting in the mountains, this state is so tyrannical that they wouldn’t have any regard for the Baloch at all. Even the few Baloch who are benefiting from the state, becoming chief ministers of Balochistan or getting other positions of power, are doing so because a political and armed struggle is underway.
“Had it not been for the few young Baloch fighting in the mountains, this state ... wouldn’t have had any regard for the Baloch at all”
Second, and this may sound very odd or not very pleasant, but had it not been for armed struggle, Balochistan would have been demographically swamped until the Baloch became a tiny minority. They tried this when they brought Afghan refugees in the 1980s, which has changed the demography while bringing cultural changes. All these madrassahs have popped up since – not that the state wasn’t making such attempts [at Islamization] before, but this was accelerated. For instance, after the catastrophic 7.7-magnitude earthquake in Awaran in September 2013, the Baloch Students Organization (BSO)-Azad and Baloch National Movement (BNM) set up relief camps in the area. But there was a military attack on them and they were cleared away. Even Oxfam and UN agencies requested permission to conduct relief work, but they weren’t allowed. Instead, [the militant Islamist group] Jamaat-ud-Dawa was allowed in. Of course, this wasn’t just for relief or charity; they wanted to conduct social engineering.
So the political struggle and armed struggle are necessarily interlinked. Do you think the British would speak with Sinn Féin had the IRA (Irish Republican Army) not existed? People often say there should be a Truth and Reconciliation commission in Balochistan – but on what basis? [In South Africa], truth and reconciliation happened when the White and Black populations were in a certain proportion, and the Whites recognized there was no other way for them to survive. Here, the state feels that it can easily discipline the Baloch using force.
The recent Gwadar sit-ins were mainly attended by women, young boys and girls, along with some men. You saw the way they were brutally attacked by state forces, with Sammi and Dr Sabiha injured. This is how they dealt with a peaceful protest. Those attacks didn’t continue because all of Balochistan rose up. There were shutter-down strikes and sit-ins across Balochistan, with people blocking roads. This upsurge forced them to talk to Mahrang and accept some demands. And they weren’t just afraid of the people sitting in Gwadar – the situation was volatile all over Balochistan, like a volcano waiting to erupt, and they understood that making any move against Mahrang would set it off. And you would have noted that throughout the Gwadar sit-ins, there have been no militant actions by the Baloch, because they know this front is strong right now and is dealing with the issues well.
One more thing: The Pakistani state has had many opportunities in the past to resolve issues in Balochistan. When General Musharraf was forced out and the PPP under [President Asif] Zardari was forming a government in September 2008, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and other groups announced a unilateral ceasefire. But nobody responded, and they went back [to militant struggle] in January 2009.
This opportunity was just like 1972, when Attaullah Mengal’s government could have been mainstreamed. But the state actors didn’t want that – they don’t want it because when people like Lt. General Obaidullah Khan Khattak go to Balochistan, they become billionaires. He was the corps commander and chief of the Frontier Constabulary (FC, the paramilitary force operating in Balochistan). The conflict is benefiting not only them, but people like Sarfaraz Bugti [current chief minister] and many others [who collaborate with the state]. However, what BYC has achieved has made nationalist political parties in Balochistan irrelevant.
A map of Balochistan with areas highlighted in red showing major insurgency zones during the 1973 to 1977 insurgency. Source: Selig Harrison / In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations.
J: Anon, would you like to add any thoughts on the nature of the armed struggle in Balochistan, and its coordination with the political side of the struggle?
Anon (A): I think it is important to understand that any political movement, and especially one entering a decisive phase in its evolution, must have three crucial elements: a core group of leaders, an armed struggle, and a united front. While the historical role of leaders like Sher Muhammad Marri and Nauroz Khan has been important, I think for the current movement, the most important role was played by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. In particular, I credit his weekly study circle and the various branches of the movement that it germinated, whether in armed struggle in the form of BLA and BLF, or the student movement in the form of BSO-Azad, or today the BYC and NDP (National Democratic Party).
It was not merely a study circle – through that avenue, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri developed an armed movement, and a mass movement or united front. And there was a clear understanding that while their current struggle is against the Pakistani establishment, their larger struggle is against imperialism. When I spoke with Karima Baloch (former chairperson BSO-Azad) and Kamal Baloch (former senior vice chairperson, BSO Azad), they were very clear about this. Even Khair Bakhsh Marri has explained in his interviews that because the Pakistani establishment is backed by US imperialism – in fact, he believed that the Pakistani state would not even survive without the US – in effect, the Pakistani establishment is playing a sub-imperialist role. Or if you want to get into technicalities, then, at minimum, it is an internal colonialist.
There is no doubt that our analysis must be situated within the global imperialist system – you cannot take the US as separate from the UK or even social democratic countries, like Scandinavian states. They are all part of the same system. For example, it’s clear that while the US benefited from its occupation of Afghanistan, so did China. This is an entire system, and Pakistan is a satellite state for this system. The satellite cannot survive without its patron, which is foremost the US imperial power. This was explained very clearly by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri in his interviews, which were recently published as a book.
And from this lens, you can see that the movement in Balochistan is not separate from, say, the Naxalite movement in India. They are not directly connected, but they are part of the same larger movement; they have many similarities and are fighting the same system.
Khair Bakhsh Marri meeting Baloch students. Image: Facebook
I remember the first time I spoke with Zahid Baloch (then chairman, BSO Azad) – I had just returned from Mama Qadeer’s Long March. I was already deeply inspired by the March, and especially by Talpur Sahab’s (unofficial) study circles held at our rest stops along the way. One of the first things Zahid explained to me was that if I wanted to understand the Baloch movement, I had to first try and understand the Naxalite movement in India. He said that all the relations you see in the Naxalite movement in India are present in our movement in Pakistan. In fact, that was the first time I started to see the Maoist model of revolutionary struggle from the perspective of Balochistan. I saw how Mao’s model – of a core linked to an armed struggle and a united front – could be developed and put into practice. This is what Khair Bakhsh Marri showed us practically how to build in Pakistan.
“If we deal with the issue of enforced disappearances in isolation from the colonial control and subjugation of Balochistan, our efforts lose all meaning.”
My conversation with Zahid probably only lasted a month. We had decided that we would meet in a month in Balochistan, but he was forcibly disappeared (on March 18th, 2014). I believe it’s critical for the Left to understand this larger context. If we deal with the issue of enforced disappearances in isolation from the colonial control and subjugation of Balochistan (and only from a rights-based perspective), our efforts lose all meaning. While a rights-based model is useful for Left politics to a certain extent, it is nevertheless inadequate, as Talpur Sahab said.
There’s a beautiful qita (fragment) by Josh (Malihabadi):
Qanoon nahi koi fitrat kay siwa
Dunya nahi kuch numood-e-taqat kay siwa
Quw’wat haasil kar, maula ban ja
Ma’bood nahi koi quw’wat kay siwa
There is no law but Nature
The world is naught but show of force
Seize the power, be the Lord
Naught is worshipped but Power
So the issue is not about rights, but about control and sovereignty. Who has control over me, my being, my land, my region? Is it the imperialist power, the sub-imperialist power, the internal colonialist, or me? That is the real question. And the straightforward answer is that I have the right over my land, my region, my labour. That is why it’s important to understand that the colonial question is also a class question. When an oppressed nation raises the question of its rights, it is also a question of class – i.e. who has the right over us?
Unfortunately, your “democratic” rights are linked to whether there are national capitalists in your region. If not, there are no democratic rights. Then, the colonial powers, feudal powers and state together determine how you should be ruled. That comes with all kinds of violence and oppression. And if you want the reaction to this to be “civilized” – conducted via bourgeois democratic norms and parliamentary debates – then frankly the democratic institutions in this country (the constitution, parliament, or courts) have neither the power nor the will to accommodate this. The reality is that if the establishment is displeased with [former Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif, he is replaced by Imran Khan’s government, and when Imran Khan displeases them, he is thrown into jail, democracy be damned. I have no sympathy with Khan or Sharif, but if such figures, representing powerful capitalist circles, are not able to take on Pakistan’s military, how do you expect us to struggle “democratically” all the way in Balochistan? You’re just taking us and the rest of the world for fools.
If you’ve been kept enslaved through the barrel of a gun, you have no option but to use the gun in return. That does not, in any way, mean that the gun is the only solution. But it is a major one in combination with other routes you may use. So if I say that Dr Allah Nazar is more important than Dr Mahrang, that doesn’t mean Mahrang is not important. But more important than both is the foundational ideology that intellectuals like Talpur Sahab and others are providing. And when all three meet – the intellectual, the political and militant spheres – that’s when you have a concrete struggle. Without this, I believe you can’t achieve anything. Only all three of these forces together can take you towards true freedom.
J: Let's move to the analysis of the contemporary situation. Talpur Sahab, can you shed more light on the current situation in Balochistan, in the post-Musharraf era? How has the movement evolved since the 1970s and 80s?
T: It is my good fortune that I am the only surviving person involved in the 1970s struggle today. And I have seen not only the struggle change, but also the whole society transform in these 50 years. Let me explain. In the Marri areas in the ‘70s, land was communally owned and every 10 years it was redistributed among the clans. So that if someone got land that wasn’t very good, it would later be swapped. So, it was a kind of primitive social communism, a form of collective ownership. Other areas had similar systems, but gradually these have disintegrated.
In the foreground: Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur (second from left) with Sher Mohammad Marri (right) and Mir Hazar Khan Ramkhani (left). Source: Private photo archive of Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur
Today, people have started selling their land rights in the Marri areas, and society has been changing from the tribal to the feudal system. Thus, the character of society has also changed – Marri society has become a lot more religious today – because their economic relations have changed. It’s safe to say this trend holds across Balochistan. I should mention that the Sardar used to be the “first among equals,” nothing more – that’s the real position of the Sardar in traditional Baloch society. Those who have become sardars now are a product of feudalism. They wield not tribal power, but feudal power.
And because society has changed, so has the nature of the struggle and its participants. Back when I went to the Marri areas, there were extremely few educated people. The BSO had only just been established (in 1967). Today, even without the educational facilities that a state should have provided, there is a high level of education. And thus, the participants of the struggle have changed to the educated classes. Of course, many tribal people are still involved and play an important role. But the balance shifted more towards the educated [middle] classes. And that has changed the way the struggle has advanced. Dr Allah Nazar is very different from Mir Hazar Khan, not that I discount the latter’s value or achievements. Without Mir Hazar Khan, the 1973 insurgency wouldn’t have taken place at all.
As [Anon] was talking about Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri: he was the beacon, the icon, and will remain so. Nawab Sahab had utmost clarity – he envisioned an egalitarian society in Balochistan. A society which had no class, which was just to everyone. He said that if a free Balochistan did not give people equality and rights, that would be a travesty. He was also clear that he wouldn’t refuse help [for the cause] from others – he used to say that even if a dog offers us help we will take it. And I believe his teachings and his clarity have trickled down and shaped the struggle.
It was my good fortune that when I used to write something, Nawab Sahab would ask me to bring a photocopy when I visited and he used to read it. Once I wrote about something “since independence,”. Nawab Sahab questioned me: “Which independence are you talking about?” After that, I started using the term “Partition.”
J: And how did the struggle spread from the Marri areas and central Balochistan to more peripheral areas like the Makran coast? What were the dynamics in these places?
T: The inspiration was the past struggles of the Baloch – people like Shahzada Abdul Karim, Nawab Nauroz Khan, Babu Sher Muhammad, and the 1973 struggle. And then, as I said, for Nawab Sahab, the Marris and others like us from the London Group to choose to remain in Afghanistan in defiance. We were staying near Lashkargah – Asad Rehman and Ahmed Rashid stayed till 1979-80; I stayed much longer. Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri was in Helmand. Fida Baloch – the famous BSO activist whom Fida Chowk in Turbat is named after – came to meet us there.
And also, Nawab Sahab’s inspiration and clarity – the ideology that this is the only way, there’s no other way. This has inspired the youth in Makran, Jhalawan, Noshki and other places including even Dera Ghazi Khan (in South Punjab) to take this path.
J: As you alluded in the beginning, the state and establishment’s economic activities are also generating a capitalist class in Balochistan, which is not necessarily in favour of the struggle for freedom. How does the movement see this group of people?
T: We see the national struggle as the primary struggle – this is an accepted fact. This class of capitalists is in fact very small and longstanding. They have been supported by the Pakistani state for a long time. You know, it’s often said that Baloch sardars have prevented the people from getting educated. But all these sardars – the likes of the Khetran Sardars, or Aali Bugti, Shahzain Bugti, Jams of Lasbela, or the Raisanis – have been nurtured by the state itself. These are the very people the struggle has been against. They are considered an integral part of the Pakistani state apparatus exploiting the Baloch. It is understood that when you are resisting the Pakistani state, you are resisting these people.
J: Could you tell us more about the social character and class basis of Balochistan and the movement?
A: If you look closely, you will find the class character in Balochistan similar to that in [revolutionary] Algeria, where the ruling class is completely aligned with the Pakistani establishment, which is in turn fully connected to imperialism.
In the same vein, you will find Mao’s conception of the ideal base area – somewhere very underdeveloped with minimal presence of the state – in areas like Mashkey or Awaran, which are emerging as base areas for the Baloch struggle. In fact, historically speaking, you wouldn’t expect Awaran to be involved, because there have always been two distinct intellectual camps in Balochistan – one led by Khair Bakhsh Marri and the other by Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, the former advocating armed struggle and the latter talking of dialogue with Pakistan.
Another crucial point is the eruption of the movement from rural areas. This is a hallmark of classical anti-colonial movements tied to the Maoist model. If you read the famous book by Selig Harrison on the history of Baloch nationalism, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, there is an interesting excerpt attributed to Sher Muhammad Marri. It shows very clearly how this movement emerges “indigenously” from the rural areas through Nauroz Khan, and develops as an emotional reaction against a colonial power. And then, how the movement connects with people like Sher Muhammad Marri or members of the London Group to grow into a “rational” anti-imperialist movement.
Mir Gul Khan, Akbar Bugti, Khair Bakhsh Marri, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Mir Ghaus addressing a rally on the balcony of the National Awami Party (NAP) Headquarters in Quetta. Source: Mir Muhammad Ali Talpur private photo archives.
This trajectory runs very close to the model you read about in Uftaadgaan-e-Khaak [Urdu translation of Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth]. Fanon is describing those revolutionaries who reject the bourgeois nationalists advocating for dialogue and, instead, head to the countryside to connect with rural movements. And with this nexus, a real struggle begins to develop, which is rational but also carries the emotionality of that context. This pure struggle is what we see in the relationship between the London group, Sher Muhammad Marri, and Khair Bakhsh Marri, and in their connections to the earlier struggles of Nauroz Khan. Talpur Sahab can shed light on this better than me. It’s becoming quite difficult to speak in his company – much of what I have learned in my life has come from him, even though I have spent limited time with him. But what I have learned in this time has been fundamental.
Another important point is the issue of clarity in the Baloch struggle. This is a key point that separates it from the Pashtun struggle, which is still caught in confusion. The Baloch struggle is very clear about itself. It is not a struggle about “rights” – it is about their land, their freedom. The Baloch struggle has no confusion about whether the Soviet Union could have liberated them earlier or the United States can now. In Khair Bakhsh Marri’s interviews, he is clear about the character of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, saying that if they were to repeat this in Balochistan, it’s better that the Baloch remain subject to Pakistan. We don’t want a situation where we gain freedom from one master only to end up serving another. This itself reflects his Maoism.
Alongside, we have his in-depth critiques of China in his interviews, when he went to China and observed the treatment of the national question. Balochistan’s primary issue is currently the question of Gwadar, and the principal contradiction in Gwadar is with China. You can travel all over Pakistan and find only a few individuals who can understand Maoism well enough to be able to see China and Mao separately, who understand China’s own imperialist role. Khair Bakhsh Marri’s interviews also clearly point to America’s role in the region, and how it is impossible to run the Pakistani state without America.
And I don’t think any other national movement – and I have conversations with Pashtun nationalists, Sindhi nationalists etc – is as clear on the idea that the society they want after the resolution of the national question is a socialist-style society, an egalitarian society. We find this in Khair Bakhsh Marri’s conversations, in Talpur Sahab’s writing, and even among activists. And I’m not talking about leaders like Karima Baloch, Kamaal Baloch, or Mahrang Baloch, but even the most grassroots activists who are not household names. You find this clarity about what they want to achieve. I know for a fact that Baloch activists were reading literature on Mao’s Long March a few months prior to their Long March to Islamabad.
So there is a continuity in the Baloch struggle – it isn’t completely spontaneous or reactive. It carries the blood of many people. And it has culminated to the point today where even those who thought that the Baloch question can be resolved within Pakistan, or that the movement was being run by the imperialist camp, are forced to admit that such a long history of struggle is impossible without a material reality.
And this is why I say that the Baloch movement is not just a movement. It is, at the same time, an organisation and a movement, where you can see decisions taken intentionally and consciously. It’s not that the Balaach incident happens and a movement [the BYC] is triggered. Balochistan has seen countless incidents like that of Balaach. Even in the 1970s, it has seen enforced disappearances and wanton murders. But people like Talpur Sahab, Mahrang, or Karima are not acting on their emotional impulses. They are taking decisions based on their principles, conditions, and emotions, evaluating which actions will take them a step forward towards the movement’s larger goals.
This is the reason why even someone like Khair Bakhsh Marri – well-established as being engaged in armed struggle from Afghanistan – completely changes his approach on his return to Pakistan. He doesn’t immediately jump into a fight. He is aware of the conditions, and works to build a base that will be useful for the future – his weekly study circle. The first time I spoke with comrade Zahid (then-chairman, BSO Azad), he said what we currently need the most is to translate revolutionary literature from English to Urdu or Balochi, so that our youth can understand it.
This is how there is a huge difference between the Baloch and Pashtun struggles. The Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) model needs more time to build the ideological and political base to lead the movement. The Baloch struggle has the political and ideological bases, as well as the connection to armed struggle, which might not be connected to each other but provide all the elements that an anti-colonial movement requires.
If you understand the Baloch struggle this way, you will have to compare it with movements in India, Nepal, and elsewhere. This is not an Arab Spring, a sudden populist upsurge, but a struggle with simultaneous political, advocacy, and militant dimensions. They have a good understanding of which dimensions to use in different contexts. I personally believe that if you want to see the closest interpretation of the Maoist model in Pakistan, you can see it in Balochistan. In all other models you’ll find something missing – they may approach Mao Tse-tung thought, but not the pure Maoist model.
J: Talpur Sahab, you mentioned a point about demographic change, with the influx of Afghan refugees post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. This has been hotly debated, with the influx of Punjabi migrants in Gwadar and other parts of Balochistan. Capitalists who run mining operations also bring workers from outside Balochistan, including Hazara Afghans and Pashtuns. How does the struggle see these populations and the question of demographic change?
T: The fighters see these people less as workers and more as collaborators, because they are helping exploit us. That’s how they see it – whether that’s right or wrong is another question. We must also ask why these workers are brought from outside, like Punjab or Sindh – because the Baloch refuse to do this work and help out the capitalists exploiting Balochistan.
My personal opinion is that these people should not be killed, and certainly “not in my name”. But I am sitting in Sindh. People who are directly affected by the situation in Balochistan have their own opinion. I have always made my position clear – there is a thin red line between being a revolutionary and being a gangster. It’s in black and white in my writings.
Second, we must understand that Baloch violence is a response to state violence. It’s not that the Baloch started violence first and forced the state to react. But if violence is perpetrated on the Baloch, there will naturally be a response. This is a fundamental point that must be understood.
Today is August 24th. In two days, we will mark the anniversary of the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 – an aged man, mercilessly killed by the state. Instead of having dialogue, the Musharraf regime found it more appropriate to push him into the Marri areas and kill him with a rocket launcher in the cave where he took refuge. So, it’s clear that this state is not ready to compromise in any instance. And if they won’t compromise, the Baloch will also not merely “offer the other cheek”. To do so is unjust to your nation, to your principles. I don’t preach violence, nor am I a soft face of violence, no. But there are certain positions I am clear about — if you exercise violence on us, the Baloch will respond in kind. Don’t expect laurels and flowers in return for brickbats.
“if you exercise violence on us, the Baloch will respond in kind. Don’t expect laurels and flowers in return for brickbats. ”
When Musharraf came to Kohlu, Balaach Marri fired rockets which didn’t reach him. Balaach asked his father Nawab Khair Bakhsh if he did the right thing. Nawab Sahab responded, “Why did you miss?” This is a life and death struggle of a nation, which has no option but to save itself. If I stay silent, I am treated violently, and if I speak up, I face violence – then why not speak up? That’s how the Baloch see it.
Akbar Bugti (center) walks with armed guards in Dera Bugti, January 2006 — seven months before the clash with the Pakistan army that led to his death. Source: Facebook
A: The status quo always expects only the oppressed to speak of peace or avoid using violence, while the powerful are permitted to operate as they please. You can go to Quetta today and see that the whole city is effectively a garrison – much like the rest of Balochistan. I was returning from Quetta on Aug 14th (Pakistan’s day of independence) 2016, travelling by way of Khuzdar. We stopped at a tea hotel and saw Rangers [paramilitary forces] putting up a banner saying “Pakistani qaum ko azadi mubarak” (Congratulations to the Pakistani nation on independence), laughably addressed from “the people of Khuzdar.” At this time, BSO-Azaad was being violently cleared from Khuzdar, and other student organisations were being planted there. Under such conditions, you tell me how you expect someone not to turn to violence? What else do they have recourse to?
We’ve all seen incidents in Islamabad and Karachi where this state has used brutal, brazen force to get its way. So, what they get up to, and get away with, in areas like Balochistan is beyond our imagination. BSO friends tell us that even giving school education to ordinary people becomes a nightmare because the state doesn’t want the Baloch to be literate. Under such conditions, there isn’t much you can achieve without guns. And if there are excesses as a result of this turn, I believe we should try to understand them. The powerful have room to calibrate and strategise their use of force – the powerless can’t be made to carry all the blame.
Also, if the FWO [Frontier Works Organization, the construction and exploration arm of the Pakistani military] has decided that their Major will remain hidden in the military camp, and only his workers visible outside, then what can we do about, say, a strategic road being built? As an analogy, if us comrades were stuck on the second floor of a house, and the state gets four workers to build a ladder so that the military could be sent in to attack us, will we spare the workers building the ladder? For us, this becomes a life and death issue – the workers will enable the military to eliminate us. So, whether we want to or not, we will be compelled to target those workers. The fact is, if that ladder must be built, why aren’t the military’s own soldiers building it? Why are they bringing in workers from here and there?
The majority of projects underway in Balochistan today, in which workers are being targeted in one way or another, are military-led projects which are ultimately aiding the war against the Baloch. Despite that, you can see videos on YouTube, where many workers and even lower ranked military personnel have been approached [by Baloch] asking them why they come into these areas, which they know are military zones under active conflict.
So, I believe everything cannot be seen from an abstract human rights perspective. And if you do judge it from that perspective, then it must be applied to everything in totality – then, for example, you can’t brush the issue of thousands of forcibly disappeared Baloch under the carpet, and only focus on the killing of a few workers as a human rights issue. This is similar to what we’re seeing in Palestine – brushing aside Israel’s long-standing violence and selectively criticising Palestinians’ targeting of a few Israelis as a human rights crisis.
I’m also not saying that all groups active in Balochistan are very progressive and should receive our support. Even we support only certain groups. The important thing is understanding the contours of imperialism and hegemony in Balochistan, along with the long history of this conflict – since 1948 and even before.
Balochistan has a different historical context from Sindh or Punjab – it’s had a much weaker relationship with Pakistan and has been occupied from the beginning. That’s also why its national question is very clearly visible, and has seen such violent excesses that no reaction may be truly unexpected. It is to the credit of people like Talpur Sahab and progressive comrades that despite all this, they are willing to distance themselves from [episodes of violence] and even criticise them. Frankly, if I was in their position, I wouldn’t be able to do so. I would say you’ve killed hundreds of my people for no reason, and I’ve only really harmed two of yours. Why such a hue and cry?
I will reiterate that the framework of rights alone is not sufficient. Rights are defined through bourgeois interpretations – the powerful get to decide who has which rights. Instead, we need to ask who has the power and who needs to get it. In Balochistan, the Pakistani state has the power [against the will of the people]; the Baloch need to do what it takes to get it. We need to view the situation through this power struggle, rather than in reactionary ways.
And yes, if Balochistan becomes an independent nation in the future and they have the power, then we will hold them accountable for any oppressions against migrant labourers, or their own labourers, and other minority groups in their state. But right now, I believe there isn’t a lot of room to question them.
J: We wanted to talk about the relationship of the Baloch movement with the Left in Pakistan – what has this been like historically, and where do you see it now?
T: The Left in Pakistan has never been able to understand the national question, especially in Balochistan. They have unfortunately had a dogmatic lens, thinking in very formulaic terms about how struggles should proceed. And sadly, they have often accepted the mainstream Pakistani narrative about the Baloch being terrorists, or engaging in conspiracies to break up Pakistan.
I’m not talking about individuals – there are selected people with good political positions who have stood in our support. But generally, the Left tends to paint all Baloch with the same brush – they stigmatise them, call them terrorists or alaaihidgi-pasand (separatist). They are resentful of the Baloch asking for separation and freedom, so they feel angry and disappointed but also fearful of them. They have not been able to understand the Baloch question and have not only accepted the state’s narrative but also promoted it.
A: Talpur Sahab is right. All I can add is that if Khair Bakhsh Marri was the Mao of this region, then the Pakistani Left has been Khrushchev. I’m not just talking about the Balochistan issue here – on the whole, the Pakistani Left has been more interested in electoral politics, about finding some kind of bourgeoisie whose coat tails they can grab on for their own politics.
It hasn’t successfully built a major movement anywhere in Pakistan, let alone the more complex context of Balochistan. Even the Hashtnagar movement (an armed struggle led by Mazdoor Kisan Party) reached a certain limit. The reason is that the Left has pursued a subservient politics, a politics of tailism, conjoined to the middle class. There is no creativity, no innovation, because that fundamentally requires a connection to the masses. Instead of working with the masses to build a radical politics, we’ve consistently been pushed by the middle classes towards a politics of compromise, focused on the electoral sphere. And frankly, such politics doesn’t leave much room for radical positions on the national question.
But the problem is that a politics of compromise leaves you nowhere – if you offer nothing radical from the mainstream, why will the masses join you over parties who are already doing this politics better than you? I believe that the Pakistani Left is a revisionist Left – a Left for which the Taliban was a bigger question than the US. Or for whom religious fundamentalism is a bigger problem than the class question. It will ultimately only find refuge in liberalism.
We also need to put this question to Left leaders: why do they support the movement in Kashmir on the grounds of national self-determination, but not in Balochistan? The Communist Party of India (Maoist) has published an article that unapologetically supports all nationalist movements in India on a logical basis – that India is not a single nation, but was made into one for the purposes of British colonialism.
This doesn’t mean that I’m calling for separatist politics in all provinces in Pakistan – we must understand the ground realities and the masses in every region. In 2010, we held a program on Bhagat Singh in Karachi, where some BSO-Azad students raised slogans for a free Balochistan. Some senior comrades from the National Students Federation raised counter-slogans of Jeevay Jeevay Pakistan (Long Live Pakistan). I spoke there and said that if a people decide what they want for their future, then we as outsiders simply don’t have the authority to dictate otherwise. If the Baloch have determined that they want a free Balochistan, you and I cannot dictate otherwise.
Allah Nazar Baloch is the leader of the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). Image: BBC
J: One last question that I want to end on is how the current Baloch movement and its key leaders are looking at the Palestinian resistance, and especially the current war and atrocities being perpetrated on the Palestinians? Is the internationalism you were alluding to earlier still a big part of the Baloch struggle?
T: The Palestinians were also deprived of their land in 1948, oppressed by both the Arab leaders and the Zionists. We also see the disproportionate nature of their oppression – the death and kidnapping of 1,100 Israelies sees retribution from more than 40,000 Palestinians. And the cowardice and cravenness of the world, the ummah specifically, for giving absolute power to an entity to literally wipe out thousands and thousands of people without any consequence. When Baloch lament that no one challenges what’s being done to them, I point to these 40,000 people and the silence of the world.
This war is the greatest tragedy of this era, this century. The silence from everyone is horrific in its cowardice and depravity. All those living in these times will have to answer for this. Because this will come for everyone – what you sow, so shall you reap.
I can’t speak for the movement right now because I’m not in touch with them very actively. To the Baloch I point to these events and say no one is going to speak for me and you. If you want to achieve something, you have to do it yourself. Some of our friends get convinced by people who are big talkers – they bring them dreams of freedom and so on. I tell them these people are only good for the talk, don’t rely on them or fall for them.
“The Palestinian struggle is a linchpin in the struggle against the entire imperialist system”
A: The Palestinian struggle is a linchpin in the struggle against the entire imperialist system. When you talk about Palestine, you’re talking about all other anti-imperialist struggles, about challenging imperialist hegemony as a whole. And that hegemony is not just asserting itself directly on oppressed peoples, but also working through its various satellites – be that Israel, India, Brazil, or Saudi Arabia. Or the Pakistani state which facilitates the exploitation of the land, resources, and people of its own internal nations for the benefit of the imperialist system.
When the US invaded and occupied Afghanistan, it didn’t just benefit the US but the entire imperialist system, including China. In the same way, these satellite states are perpetuating an internal colonial system that sustains the imperialist system as a whole. It doesn’t matter whether Gwadar goes to China, the US or Saudi Arabia – what’s important is that it no longer belongs to the Baloch.
There is one more important lesson we can draw. Today, it is crucial for us to think about regional alliances. Without them, it’s difficult to defeat these powers – not impossible, but difficult. If the powers are linked into a larger system, it’s important for us to consider linking up our struggles too. We saw that if the Palestinian struggle did not have the support of resistance forces from Yemen, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, and others then it would have been harder for them to challenge imperialist powers. And I have had conversations with Baloch friends and comrades about the question of building alliances with other oppressed groups.
I think one problem we had with the Comintern was the outsized power of the Soviet Union. Rather than having clientelistic relationships, we need alliances built among oppressed sections on an equal footing. From Catalonia to Palestine, Kurdistan to Balochistan and further – that is really important. And also alliances among oppressed nations within Pakistan – even those who aren’t fighting for separation but demanding rights within the state. There is space and a need for such alliances.
Otherwise, as Talpur Sahab has written and Mir Khair Bakhsh Marri has stated many times, if you have any expectations of help from imperialist powers or their satellite states to advance your struggle, that is not going to happen. I think the Baloch at least are very clear on this question. For them, the more valuable work is to build unity with workers to advance the struggle. And in this work, the Palestinian struggle is an iconic example.
J: We echo your final words that the Palestinian struggle is no longer just a struggle for Palestine but a struggle for all oppressed peoples in the world.
Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur (@mmatalpur) is a political organizer and a prominent figure in the Baloch struggle. He is also a public intellectual and writer, contributing extensively to discussions on the history and politics of Balochistan
Anonymous is a Left activist from Pakistan