Siraj Sikder: A Legacy of Freedom
Siraj Sikder and Sarbahara Party’s violent yet emancipatory struggles hold key lessons for Bangladesh and its post-authoritarian future.
Illustration: Jamhoor
In the early morning of 25 April 1971, the people of Jhalokathi district woke up to the insidious sound of Pakistani military gunboats approaching from the southeast. It had been exactly a month since the Pakistani military began their infamous ‘Operation Searchlight,’ which involved genocide, rape, and arson and ignited Bangladesh’s war of independence; since then, the military had started to spread out and take control of the rest of East Pakistan. The residents of Jhalokathi had heard horrifying stories of military aggression from those fleeing the occupied regions. The sound of gunboats inspired nothing but horror among them.
A small group of young men were watching over the local steamboat ghat (port) from afar. They had been undergoing defense training inside a primary school for potential military intervention, but they lacked both manpower and firepower. The ghat was abandoned except for one person named Adam Ali, a local leader of dock workers. To their surprise, the scouts discovered Adam Ali waving a Pakistani flag to capture the gunboats' attention. They had known that a local influential Pir (cleric) and his followers were supporters of the Pakistani army, but they had not considered that a Bengali villager would be an active collaborator. Adam Ali tried to draw attention till the gunboats turned into dots on the horizon, but all his attempts failed; luckily for the people of Jhalokathi, the gunboats passed through the ghat and headed towards Barisal. But Adam Ali was not so fortunate — on his way back home, somebody shot him dead two hundred yards from the ghat. The freedom fighter scouts would later learn that members of the underground communist party Purba Banglar Sramik Andalan (East Bengal Workers Movement, EBWM) killed Adam Ali as he had betrayed and put his fellow villagers in danger. This is how Shafiul Islam, a police officer who became a freedom fighter, discovered EBWM building a stronghold deep inside a guava garden. He also learned that this underground party, which later renamed itself the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (or Sarbahara Party, SP), was led by Siraj Sikder.
The SP was a Maoist guerilla party based in East Pakistan, later Bangladesh. SP sprouted from EBWM during the liberation war and was active in post-independence Bangladesh. The party saw the new government of Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) not as a people's government but rather as an extension of Indian expansionism. During this time, the ruling party BAL, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, facilitated mass corruption, extortion, murder, and violently repressed opposition. Other leftist parties like the National Awami Party, under the socialist peasant leader Maulana Bhashani (NAP-B), and Jatiya Samajtantrik Dol (JASOD) opposed the new government too, but SP’s line of politics differed radically from theirs. For example, NAP-B was well-versed in public engagement and had supporting organizations like farmer associations and student wings through which they mobilized people, whereas SP’s political line and focus on guerilla warfare aligned more with the Naxalites. NAP-B was a socialist party with a heavy leaning toward Maoism, but SP was strictly Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. It did not have front organizations, and party members’ names were kept secret. They conducted guerrilla operations against the new ruling class to prevent the ongoing brutal exploitation in the war-devastated Bangladesh.
In this flyer released by the National Liberation Front of East Bengal, the East Bengal Sarbahara Party and the Patriotic Army of East Bengal announce the support of the ‘hartal’ against Indian expansionism and the traitorous Awami League government. Image: The Syed Irfanul Bari Collection
Siraj Sikder’s name is inseparable from the history of Bangladesh. His political ideas and actions have made him controversial yet relevant over and over again. At the time of writing this article, a peaceful student movement to reform the quota system for government service jobs has transformed into a mass uprising to topple the authoritarian government in Bangladesh. The same BAL, but now led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter Sheikh Hasina, in power for more than fifteen years, did not hesitate to employ brute violence against peaceful protesters just to secure their power. The state opened fire and attacked protesters with deadly weapons, killing more than 600 and more than eleven thousand were injured. The last time Bangladeshis faced such violence was right after independence at the hands of the BAL regime, but at that time, people had political forces like the SP to counter state oppression.
“Sikder’s legacy does not answer broadly whether a revolutionary should choose violence. Rather, it breaks this binary and suggests that the question should be when and why the oppressed choose violent resistance instead.”
During the Bloody July uprising, those who were trying to advance the resistance felt the necessity for a people's army; an army who’d defend the unarmed people from the oppressive and vengeful government, something Siraj Sikder once tried to build. Now, perhaps it is more important than ever to talk about Siraj Sikder, a man either frowned upon as a murderer or glorified as the communist who took up arms to defend the sarbahara, the proletariat. The large mural of Sikder. drawn after the Bloody July uprising, over Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s mural in Dhaka University suggests a restoration of his legacy as a defender of the proletariat. Siraj Sikder’s life as a revolutionary and his understanding of colonialism, class antagonism, and political strategies provide us with valuable insights into the question of freedom and resistance, and the question of violence. Here, I want to argue that Sikder’s legacy does not answer broadly whether a revolutionary should choose violence. Rather, it breaks this binary and suggests that the question should be when and why the oppressed choose violent resistance instead. Sikder’s contribution to the liberation war of Bangladesh has been broadly undermined, yet it shows the merit of systemic exploration to determine objectives and dedication to the revolution, especially how it prepares the people to defend themselves from unprecedented aggression, whether from a colonial power or a state.
A chilling glimpse into a dark chapter of Bangladesh's history. Siraj Sikdar's courageous stand against corruption and authoritarianism led to a tragic end. Image: Mir Rifat Us Saleheen
In Search of A Revolution
Siraj Sikder’s early background was devoid of working-class politics. Born in 1944, Sikder came from a well-off Muslim family in Shariatpur, East Bengal. When he was admitted into the Engineering University of Dhaka (now Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, BUET) in 1963, East Bengal had become East Pakistan (EP) and was under the iron fist of Ayub Khan’s military regime. University campuses were hotbeds for anti-Ayub resistance and Sikder became one of the organizers of the East Pakistan Student Union, a leftist student organization. He sided with the China faction when the organization split in 1965 over the Soviet-China line debate and later became vice president of the pro-Peking group. He was deeply moved by how Mao Tse Tung and his followers had fought and established communist China; throughout his revolutionary life, he undertook many actions directly inspired by Mao’s work. At that time, this sentiment for Maoism was not uncommon among the young communists. However, the actions taken as a result would mark the fundamental difference between Sikder and the rest of the revolutionaries. At the end of his student life, Siraj Sikder became fully committed to the revolutionary path for a free and classless society.
Siraj Sikder found the Marxists of East Pakistan neither capable nor eligible for a revolution. He concluded that many lacked theoretical understanding and failed to connect theory with their struggles — a deduction he made from the debates and splits over determining primary objectives. This incapability of understanding theories and praxis according to the context of East Bengal convinced him to start from scratch. So Siraj Sikder, along with his few other comrades who shared similar frustrations, embarked on a journey to determine a revolutionary strategy and prepare themselves accordingly. Sikder’s first attempt was in 1967, after his completion of a civil engineering degree. He took a job in Teknaf, Chittagong, the southernmost point of Bangladesh, which shares a border with Burma (Myanmar). Siraj thought the hill tracts of Chittagong could be the Naxalbari of East Pakistan and tried to create a guerrilla base with a tunnel system there. They also attempted to establish connections with the communists of Burma- they covertly crossed the Naf River and went to Arakan to meet with the Maoist party of Burma. Although both their objectives in Teknaf were unsuccessful, Sikder saw them as opportunities to learn from.
Siraj Sikder wanted to do a deeper dive and formulate theories based on a Marxist framework to understand the condition of East Bengal with a heavy emphasis on Maoism. The purpose was to assess what their next step for the revolution should be. So he started Mao Tse Tung Chintadhara Gobeshonakendra (Maoist Thought Research Center) in 1967. In 1968 Sikder started a new party called East Bengal Workers Movement. That same year, Siraj Sikder published a thesis to determine the new party's political line and strategy, titled Purba Banglar Sramik Andolon Er Thesis or Thesis for the East Bengal Workers Movement. This thesis was the culmination of the past couple of years of study, exploration, experimentation, and on-the-ground experience, and provided some critical decisions regarding EBWM’s stance on national and international issues.
A Thesis of Freedom
The East Bengal Workers Movement’s thesis holds historical significance for several reasons. Siraj Sikder adopted dialectical materialism as its theoretical framework; specifically, it adopted a Maoist approach, considering East Bengal a semi-feudal agrarian society. It asked the central question of why the communist party of East Pakistan had failed to create an anti-colonial, anti-feudal movement and establish socialism. It is essential to remember that it was written to determine the parties' agendas. Therefore, it was not written for academic purposes despite following a thesis structure. Yet, it offered some important arguments.
“The influence of the Naxalbari movement...was fairly visible in EBWM’s program. It argued that only an armed revolution could achieve its goals as the colonial state would inevitably use brute force through laws, police, and army to suppress the masses.”
Firstly, the thesis tried to identify the major ongoing conflicts in East Bengal. It stated the primary conflicts were a) the national struggle of the people of East Bengal against Pakistan’s colonization; b) farmers of East Bengal’s struggle against feudalism; c) the people of East Bengal’s struggle against US imperialism, Soviet reformism, and imperialism, and Indian expansionism; d) East Bengal’s working class against the bourgeois class. It argued that the major conflict at the moment was that the Pakistani state was treating East Pakistan not as a wing of the country but rather as a colony by accurately portraying the power imbalance and economic exploitation, similar to colonialism. It also suggested that only a national people’s struggle against this colonization would be able to unite everyone in East Bengal. The thesis thus concluded that the primary focus should be on the national struggle against Pakistan’s colonization and that this freedom from colonialism must come through a democratic, national revolution, which would also eliminate existing feudalism.
This thesis became the cornerstone of EBWM’s activities. When this was published, no other political party had demanded the separation of East Pakistan; at best, nationalists like the Awami League, demanded autonomy. From that perspective, the EBWM was the first political party to publicly call for the independence of Bangladesh. The influence of the Naxalbari movement, which had started a year before this thesis was published, was fairly visible in EBWM’s program. It argued that only an armed revolution could achieve its goals as the colonial state would inevitably use brute force through laws, police, and army to suppress the masses.
Its prediction of a violent crackdown against the national democratic movement came true soon after. The mass uprising against the Ayub regime forced him to step down in 1969. Ayub’s successor, General Yahya Khan, eventually arranged a national election in 1970 but did not let the elected party, Awami League, form the government; instead, the army led a violent crackdown in early 1971. Only a few parties, like the NAP (B) and EBWM, had rejected the election and demanded complete independence. EBWM had already been working according to their thesis and preparing themselves for war. This helped the party take action promptly post-1970 elections but also narrowed the scope to engage with the public openly as they had to operate secretly. Sikder wanted to create strongholds in rural and secluded areas like the hill tracts of Chittagong. While other parties were preparing for the election, EBWM urged others to prepare for war. In fact, EBWM had already started to wage their war. In 1970, a guerrilla squad of EBWM discharged Molotov cocktails in front of the Bureau of National Reconstruction (BNR) and the United States Information Center (USIR). Both of these organizations were accused of serving the Pakistan junta and USA’s imperialist interests. Following the liberation war’s formal declaration on 25th March of 1971, Siraj Sikder moved to Barisal district and later Jhalokathi to create one of the first resistance groups in Peyara Bagan.
Resistance at Peyara Bagan
Located in Jhalokathi, Peyara Bagan (guava garden) is a forest encompassing around seventy-two square miles and surrounded by sixty-two villages. Inside the forest, river trails spread through, which people use to travel and transport harvested guavas. By the time the war started, EBWM had spread their operations throughout East Pakistan, including Barisal. When Siraj Sikder arrived at Jhalokathi, they decided to make Peyara Bagan their main camp. On the 25th of April, the Pakistani army took over Barisal city, and people started fleeing to more rural areas. Peyara Bagan became one of the safe havens for refugees from the Pakistani military and their Bengali collaborators (Rajakars) because of the protection EBWM guerillas provided. On 30 April, the party formed Purba Bangla Jatiya Muktibahini, or the National Freedom Fighters of East Bengal, a people’s army that defended the refugees in Peyara Bagan and executed guerrilla attacks against the army. During this crucial period, they changed the party name to Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party, supposedly to portray a revolutionary army front rather than EBWM’s worker orientation.
Peyara Bagan became a Sherwood forest for the refugees, and the Sarbahara Party was their own merry men who protected the helpless. Many joined their forces to fight against the Pakistani army, including police officer Shafiul Islam, who commanded the scouts on the lookout on the 25th April morning. He and other police officers, along with students, submitted all the arms they looted from the Jhalokathi police station and joined the people's army. Mr. Islam’s memoir, who later retired as the Assistant Inspector General (AIG) of Bangladesh Police, gives us valuable insight from an outsider’s perspective of the party and how they built the resistance. According to him, it was Siraj Sikder’s men who approached him and local Awami League leaders, after the Adam Ali incident, to create a united force against the Pakistan military. The SP largely conducted ambushes on Pakistani gunboats and army camps. Munir Morshed, a SP member, estimated around a hundred thousand people were inside the Peyara Bagan. From his account, the first front of Peyara Bagan was divided into eight sectors, each sector having one guerilla commander overseeing the operations. The disciplinary rules for the fighters were directly inspired by Mao’s “On Guerilla Warfare.”
Peyara Bagan became one of the main targets of the Pakistani army right after the capture of Barisal city. The army could not ignore the ambushes their men were facing from SP fighters and the number of refugees they were protecting. So, the army and their collaborators focused on capturing SP’s base camp. First, the army assigned a vast number of collaborators to chop down all the trees. Each day, the Rajakars chopped off a few trees, and the military moved their camp a little closer. They guarded heavily on land and river at night so that none could escape. To break this siege and relocate refugees to a safer place, the SP created a suicide squad. At 9 PM on 10 June, the squad attacked the Pakistani camp of Kuriyana drawing away the gunboats. This diversion gave the refugees and other guerillas enough time to cross the Sugondha River and relocate to safer places nearby. Later, the SP guerillas recaptured their camp but also built a second front in Peyara Bagan.
The resistance of Peyara Bagan was one of the earliest instances of armed resistance against the Pakistani military. AIG Shafiul Islam credited this historical incident to Siraj Sikder’s vision and guerilla warfare strategy. He was right about Siraj’s foresight; in fact, the whole movement can be traced back to Sikder’s thesis written in 1968. The prediction of war and the idea of creating a united front were also derived from Sikder’s work. The journey of the Sarbahara Party began with their understanding of colonization and how to defeat that.
Source: Daily Ittefaq from Songramer Notebook
New Country, Same Struggle
Bangladesh was liberated from Pakistan after nine months of war, with crucial support from India. After the war, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of AL, formed a new government with unanimous support. There were many challenges in the war-torn country to rehabilitate everyone. There were overwhelming reports of money extortion, seizure of properties, looting, kidnapping, torture, murder, etc. A majority of these were done by the ruling party members; AL itself was accused of favoritism and chauvinism in many sectors.. The victims of this aggression included political opponents, disempowered people like the working class, religious minorities, and indigenous people. AL became authoritarian and used the Rakkhibahini, a paramilitary force, to suppress and exterminate any form of opposition, particularly the leftists. This combination of misgovernance and authoritarianism resulted in catastrophes like the famine of 1974. Mujib’s ultimate authoritarian version unfolded in 1975 through Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BaKSAL), a one-party state that banned all opposition parties.
The Sarbahara Party had a thorny relationship with the Awami League long before independence. AL saw Maoists as a threat to their existence. In fact, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was discussing power handover after the election with the US Consulate General Archer K Blood in 1971, he asked, “Does the United States want to see military confrontation with the prospect of eventual communist domination of Bengal or would it prefer a political solution to the current crisis?”
During the war, despite a treaty between the Sarbahara party and the local Awami League leaders, there were reports of Maoists killed by AL; notably, the murder of Samiullah Azmi, one of the founding members and second-in-command of the Sarbahara Party. In October 1971, SP published a statement claiming AL was terminating and arresting SP members in the middle of the war. They called the Awami League as the chhoy paharer dalal or agent of the six mountains, where mountains symbolized different imperialist and capitalist forces like India, Soviet Russia, the US, etc. Moreover, AL’s allegiance to India and their presence in Bangladesh were not received well. Especially, the Indian military were accused of looting Bangladeshi properties and killing maoists; reports of such incidences were published in Haq Kotha, a Bhashani-run publication. After independence, SP published an open letter to the new AL government demanding the removal of all Indian military and non-military personnel. Indian troops were eventually removed, but the situation did not get better, rather, Haq Kotha continued reporting on state-sanctioned murder of communists and general people. Once free of Pakistan’s colonization, Indian expansionism through AL became the primary struggle of Bangladesh.
The Sarbahara Party's struggle to defeat the agent of six mountains pushed the party to its peak. From 1972, the party began to get stronger throughout the country. AL’s continued oppression made people more sympathetic towards SP’s cause. Many young students and workers joined the party with the dream of creating a class-less society. The party was known for being well-disciplined and operated in urban and rural areas. SP could not have a front organization because anyone connected to SP or Naxalites was persecuted violently. However, its underground network was well-connected with other political parties, sympathizers and often collaborated to build the People's army and resistance. This ranged from leftist parties like NAP-B to indigenous rights groups from Chittagong hill tracts. Surprisingly, many officers in the military and the police were party members or sympathizers. For example, Siraj Sikder and Colonel Taher of JASOD briefly started a military and political training program in Chittagong. On the Victory Days of both 1973 and 1974, when the party called for hartal (strike), Maulana Bhashani openly supported Siraj Sikder. Even though they had political disagreements on many issues, on the question of AL’s oppression and India’s expansionism, these parties often collaborated.
The SP’s objective was to first liberate the villages from Awami League’s control, by defending people from the aggressions of the police and the Rakkhibahini. Just like the Naxalites, SP also became known for armed operations and exterminating national and class enemies in covert and daring operations such as attacking police stations, banks, or Rakkhibahini camps. Because it was difficult to identify who was working for Siraj Sikder, their anonymity also stoked fear among the state. A guerilla group that could defend the helpless and retaliate against oppressors was bound to become mythical figures in a situation where the majority could not even dare speak. Activist Dr. Zafrullah Chowdhury recounted witnessing Sikder pose as a laborer and take a lift from a police van; Haq Kotha’s editor Syed Irfanul Bari, during his imprisonment, discovered one of the guards was an SP member. Many actually saw Sikder’s face for the first time only after he was killed. As Sikder once said, “"আর কয়েকটা শত্রু খতম হলেই তো গ্রামগুলো আমাদের জনগণ যেনো জল, গেরিলারা মাছের মতো সাঁতরায়” (“The people are like water, and the guerillas are the fish that swim through that water”).
There are countless stories of guerillas defending the poor from Awami League goons or attacking the police station with almost no weapons. Bichitra, a Bangladeshi magazine, claims at least 58 police stations were attacked in the last six months of 1973; a majority of these attacks were credited to SP. Their popularity among the public was most visible when they called strikes on the victory day of ‘73 and ‘74. The nationwide hartal demonstrated the public's support for SP's assertion that Bangladesh's freedom has not yet been achieved.
The features and qualities that enabled the Sarbahara Party to become such a strong party were also the reasons for its decline. Violent actions were not always welcomed by the people, at times even by party sympathizers. Some of their actions were deemed too extreme or unnecessary, for example, the murder of party members or sympathizers such as Humayun Kabir, a teacher at Dhaka University. There were cases where bandits looted or killed people in the name of the Sarbahara Party. For an underground party, it was hard to debunk accusations. In many places, as a result, people started to fear SP as looters and bandits. Raisuddin Arif, once an active guerilla member of the Sarbahara Party, remarked that the constant fear of state persecution and propaganda from every direction created an environment of paranoia even within the party members. This created many “ultra-revolutionaries” in the party.
Another contributing factor was the party’s lack of public engagement, which added to its misrepresentation driven by the BAL government propaganda. SP was able to garner significant credibility among the people, visible on the mass strike of Victory Day in 1974. According to Arif, this success inspired Siraj Sikder to emphasize public engagement. Perhaps he would have taken such initiatives, but Sikder’s time fell short. A few weeks after the successful strike, Siraj Sikder was arrested by the police in Chittagong. On 2 January 1975, he was found dead in Savar, Dhaka, an act regarded as one of the most controversial extrajudicial killings under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The official report claims police shot him when he was trying to flee while his hands were tied. After Sikder’s death, the Sarbahara Party declined rapidly due to internal factions and distrust. However, the murder of Siraj Sikder also signaled the beginning of the Awami regime's end. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed by a group of army officers on 15 August 1975. Major Noor, one of the co-conspirators of the coup, later justified his involvement by saying it was retaliation for the death of his leader, Siraj Sikder.
“Siraj Sikder and his Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party showed that the question should not be whether the oppressed should be non-violent or not; rather, it should be what conditions force the people to resist violently to achieve freedom. It shows the necessity of strong and democratic engagement between the people and their army — a people’s army.”
As I write this article, Bangladesh is going through a major transition. The youth toppled the Awami League regime, the same party that created the authoritarian regime during the time of Siraj Sikder. The uprising of July 2024, the only mass uprising in Bangladesh’s history without a political party in charge, was eventually successful because of the students' and the public's extraordinary courage and determination. But the cost of life was also too high.
During the fifteen days of continuous arrests, torture, and murder by the state, I could not help but wonder what would have happened if we had someone like Siraj Sikder. Or, what kind of decisions this new generation of rebels might have taken if they had incorporated the lessons Sikder taught us. One of the major contributions of Siraj Sikder is his methodological exploration of material conditions to determine political strategy. This theoretical and practical exploration led him to the EBWM thesis, which made liberation from Pakistan’s colonialism their primary goal. The resistance of Peyara Bagan, one of the first frontiers of the war, was the direct result of this objective. The SP’s violent actions are not above criticism; in fact, they should be discussed more frequently and elaborately. However, it does not imply we should impetuously reject their struggle altogether. It is important to understand that in situations where there is no rule of law for the general people with a violently oppressive colonizer or fascist government, there are not many options left. If anything, Siraj Sikder and his Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party showed that the question should not be whether the oppressed should be non-violent or not; rather, it should be what conditions force the people to resist violently to achieve freedom. It shows the necessity of strong and democratic engagement between the people and their army — a people’s army.
Mir Rifat Us Saleheen is a historian currently working as a lecturer in Brac University, Dhaka. His work focuses on radical media, political mobilization, and transnational solidarity movements. He is also working on preserving and digitizing endangered archives in Bangladesh.